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Abstract: The interactive-alignment model of dialogue provides
an account of dialogue at the level of explanation normally associ-
ated with cognitive psychology. We develop our claim that inter-
locutors align their mental models via priming at many levels of
linguistic representation, explicate our notion of automaticity, de-
fend the minimal role of “other modeling,” and discuss the rela-
tionship between monologue and dialogue. The account can be
applied to social and developmental psychology, and would bene-
fit from computational modeling.
The target article set out to show how it would be possible
to develop a theory of interactive language processing at the
level of explanation normally associated with cognitive psy-
chology. In our theory, successful communication involves
the alignment of interlocutors’ representations. We pro-
posed that each level of representation becomes aligned via
an automatic process that we treat as a form of priming, and
that alignment at one level automatically strengthens align-
ment at other levels. The role of conscious or deliberate
strategies involving explicit reasoning about the mental
states of one’s interlocutor is comparatively small in our ac-
count.
Our commentators have raised a number of insightful
points that have caused us to refine our proposals. Many
commentators have focused on the nature of the alignment
process. At a basic level, they consider whether alignment is
the primary mechanism leading to conversational success, to
what extent it is automatic, and whether it can be explained
by a single mechanism at all levels and in all contexts. Com-
mentators have also questioned our downplaying of “other
modeling” in ordinary conversation and our claims about the
nature of the difference between monologue and dialogue.
In responding to these and other comments, we have di-
vided our reply into eleven sections whose order roughly fol-
lows that of the topics raised in our target article.
R1. To what extent do interlocutors align?
Perhaps the most basic issue about our model is whether
interlocutors actually align their situation models, or, less
dramatically, whether they align to the extent that we claim
they do. Schober proposes that interlocutors may be much
less aligned than they appear even when they believe that
they have understood each other. Of course, this would not
matter if it solely concerned rare cases of genuine misun-
derstanding (e.g., when two interlocutors refer to different
people called John); see also Branigan, who points out that
communication may be “successful” in some sense even
when there is some misunderstanding. But Schober argues
that misalignment is endemic to dialogue. His comments
relate particularly to the interpretation of referring expres-
sions with respect to the discourse model. He draws on ex-
amples from surveys where respondents interpret terms in
ways that are very different from those intended by the sur-
vey compositors. Our response is that such surveys do not
constitute dialogue: The compositors construct the survey,
and the respondents then respond. There is no feedback,
no possibility for repair, and hence no interactive align-
ment. Schober also raises the important point that people
need not necessarily fully interpret expressions (Clark &
Wilkes-Gibbs 1986). In fact, full interpretation probably
does not always occur in the comprehension of monologue
(Barton & Sanford 1993; Frazier & Rayner 1990; Frisson &
Pickering 1999; 2001; cf. Sanford & Sturt 2002), with peo-
ple often not determining the precise sense of referring ex-
pressions (e.g., newspaper meaning an object vs. a day’s edi-
tion), and there is no reason to assume that dialogue is any
different. We suspect that both producers and comprehen-
ders determine meaning to the extent necessary for current
purposes, and that one way in which interlocutors align is
by each processing referring expressions to equal depth.
R2. What precisely are they aligning?
Several commentators appear concerned with the question
of what exactly is being aligned within our model. At the
“lower levels” of phonology, syntax, the lexicon, and so on,
interlocutors presumably align the representational con-
tent of each of those levels (phonemes, syntactic structures,
lexical items, etc.), but it is perhaps less clear what they
align at the level of the situation model. In the target arti-
cle, our intention was to argue for alignment of structural
aspects of the situation model, as exemplified by our exam-
ple of reference frames. Some of our commentators assume
that we are referring to the content of the situation model.
The questions about alignment of content are much more
difficult, and we shall try to explain the issues below.
In our account, interlocutors align on representations
relevant to the dialogue. These include lexical, semantic,
and syntactic representations, but also the situation model.
So if, at a given point in a conversation, one interlocutor has
a situation model containing two individuals, Mary and
John, with Mary in focus, with each at different locations,
and so on, then the conversation will be successful to the
extent that the other interlocutor constructs the same situ-
ation model. Of course, one interlocutor can now introduce
another character (or a new relation between the existing
characters) – indeed, introducing new information is cen-
tral to any conversation that is not entirely repetitive. To do
this, the speaker draws upon his knowledge (typically using
long-term memory) and adds information to his situation
model. The effect of the alignment is that the listener up-
dates his model so that it remains similar to that of the
speaker. For example, the listener will interpret ambiguous
words and utterances in the way that the speaker has em-
ployed them.
A much bolder claim is that the choice of new topics is
affected by alignment. We did not make this claim in the
target article, although we believe that it is true to some ex-
tent. For example, if one interlocutor refers to the couch,
then the other is more likely to refer to the couch as well
(Brennan & Clark 1996; Garrod & Anderson 1987). As a re-
sult of this, the use of couch presumably activates knowl-
edge about couches, and hence makes it more likely that
the interlocutor will talk about couches rather than some
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other topic. To this extent, alignment is surely unsurprising
(and simply amounts to the claim that interlocutors will per-
sist with particular topics).
It may also be that interlocutors align on particular styles
of reasoning or accessing of knowledge. For instance, if one
interlocutor is engaged in a careful search of long-term
memory, then the other will tend to behave similarly (e.g.,
if you play a general-knowledge game seriously, then I am
likely to do so too). Alignment on style of reasoning is rele-
vant to the construction of the situation model (cf. Gentner
& Markman 1997), but takes us beyond the scope of the tar-
get article, just as nonlinguistic imitation more generally
does (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh 1999). For now, our goals are
limited to understanding linguistic factors that assist in the
alignment of situation models.
Cutting questions our characterization of interactive
alignment as reflecting a direct link between interlocutors.
He suggests that it only has an indirect effect on the lan-
guage processes themselves. To answer this comment we
need to clarify how interactive alignment relates to lan-
guage processing. As we have said, our contention is that in-
teractive alignment (and in particular the automatic align-
ment channels) affects the structures used in production
and interpretation rather than directly determining the
content of production and interpretation. In other words,
we assume that alignment provides an explanation of the
manner in which interlocutors produce and interpret con-
tributions. So we propose that alignment channels only pro-
duce a direct link between the structures that the inter-
locutors use in language processing. Hence, the alignment
process is automatic and direct, even though it does not de-
termine exactly what the speaker produces (as this depends
on his long-term knowledge) or how the addressee inter-
prets what he hears “beyond” the level of the situation
model.
Other commentators also query whether we have speci-
fied the appropriate mechanism for alignment of situation
models. They raise this concern in relation to two more spe-
cific topics: whether there is one alignment mechanism or
several (Branigan, Glucksberg, and Markman, Kim,
Larkey, Narvaez, & Stilwell [Markman et al.]), and
whether (or in what sense) alignment is automatic (Krauss
& Pardo). All of these commentaries, in some sense, are
concerned with the issue of how alignment could affect the
content of situation models. We address these in the fol-
lowing two sections.
R3. The mechanisms of alignment
Several commentators question the details of the interac-
tive alignment mechanism itself and point out that we have
not fully specified a mechanistic account. Brown-Schmidt
& Tanenhaus make a general plea for modeling, which we
fully agree with (see sect. R11). Goldinger & Azuma ar-
gue that we do not give a detailed characterization of the
process by which alignment comes about. We have no com-
mitment to interactive-activation models and are open to
the suggestion that Grossberg’s (1980) adaptive-resonance
theory may provide an appropriate framework for the in-
teractive-alignment account.1
Beyond this, two somewhat different issues are raised.
Some commentators argue that we assume alignment is
based on transient activation, and they propose instead that
it is based on facilitated memory retrieval or implicit learn-
ing. Others claim that we are wrong to assume a unified ac-
count for all levels of alignment.
Kaschak & Glenberg argue that alignment is not due
to priming but rather to a facilitated memory retrieval
mechanism. In response, we note that the interactive-align-
ment model is specified at a functional level and makes no
commitment to specific mechanisms, and that we use the
term “priming” to refer to both transient activation and fa-
cilitation in memory-based accounts. Our model attempts
to capture the way in which representations used for both
production and comprehension automatically become
aligned as a consequence of the process of interaction.
These representations may be subject to transient activa-
tion or, instead, there may be enhancement of the mecha-
nisms underlying their retrieval from memory (as envisaged
by Kashak & Glenberg).
Perhaps more likely, there may be two separate mecha-
nisms involved in alignment. For example, some recent ac-
counts of syntactic priming are based on implicit learning
(Bock & Griffin 2000; Chang et al. 2000), whereas some are
based on activation of grammatical nodes (Hartsuiker et al.
2004; Pickering & Branigan 1998). Some experimental re-
search finds clear evidence for long-term priming that is
largely unaffected by intervening material (Bock & Griffin
2000; Hartsuiker & Westenberg 2000), whereas others
shows rapid decay (Branigan et al. 1999; Levelt & Kelter
1982; Wheeldon & Smith 2003). Most likely, different tasks
and sentence types lead to very different time-courses of
priming. Although most of this work does not involve dia-
logue (except Levelt & Kelter 1982), under our account we
would expect similar patterns of results to occur in dia-
logue. We therefore suggest that transient activation ex-
plains some aspects of alignment, and memory-based
mechanisms explain other aspects of alignment. In section
R9 below, we suggest that alignment due to routinization is
likely to involve the establishment of memory traces for
semi-fixed expressions.
Schiller & de Ruiter argue that interactive alignment
involves storing and re-using selected fragments from pre-
vious utterances (see sect. R9); this constitutes a specific
version of a memory-based account. However, their argu-
ment is based on the claim that priming is insufficient to ac-
count for interactive alignment because syntactic priming
effects are too weak. In fact, the 10–20% effects that they
refer to, occur in monologue. In dialogue, our studies have
shown 55% priming effects when the verb is repeated
(Branigan et al. 2000) and up to 47% with a rare structure
when the noun is repeated (Cleland & Pickering 2003).
Likewise, lexical entrainment almost always occurs for am-
biguous words (Brennan & Clark 1996; Garrod & Ander-
son 1987). In our model, percolation effects between levels
also increase the degree of alignment, and extended dia-
logue iteratively reinforces alignment.
A number of commentators question whether alignment
operates in the same way at all levels in our model. Mark-
man et al. argue that there are different requirements on
alignment at the different levels. In particular, they sepa-
rate the situation model from lower levels of linguistic rep-
resentation. We agree that the structural alignment process
they identify may well be appropriate at the level of the sit-
uation model, because models reflect complex higher order
relations between elements (see sect 2.2 of the target arti-
cle). However, we disagree with their argument that, unlike
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lower level representations, situation models have to be
partially misaligned either to ensure that given-new con-
ventions are followed, or for the maintenance of common
ground. We propose that these requirements can be ful-
filled through the implicit common ground which does not
differentiate between the speaker’s and listener’s situation
models.
Branigan also separates the situation model from other
levels, but for reasons that differ from those of Markman
et al. In our terms, she accepts channels of alignment at
syntactic, lexical, and morpho-phonological levels but not at
the level of the situation model, because she believes that
utterances do not provide direct evidence about the situa-
tion model. She claims that I am in row two provides direct
evidence about lower levels, whereas the listener has to in-
terpret the utterance (presumably, by using background
knowledge) in order to construct the situation model. We
disagree with this, because all levels of analysis require a
combination of top-down and bottom-up information. For
example, resolving phonemes, ambiguous words, or syntac-
tically ambiguous utterances requires the use of context. It
is therefore wrong to assume that only the level of the situ-
ation model is “abstract.” We therefore see no reason to as-
sume that channels of alignment are used only at lower lev-
els, nor do we see any reason to alter our assumption that
alignment at lower levels leads to alignment at the level of
the situation model.
Warren & Rayner argue that the priming link between
individuals’ situation models must be different from that for
lower levels. This is because interlocutors do not necessar-
ily begin dialogues with similar situation representations
and so alignment has to be built up over a period of inter-
action. Again, we see no fundamental difference between
situation models and lower levels in this respect – align-
ment at all levels is built up, though the rate of alignment
may differ at different levels. Additionally, Warren &
Rayner question how conflicts in alignment at different lev-
els are resolved (e.g., when aligning on the same name,
“John” might produce a semantic misalignment in contexts
where there are two Johns present). In fact, the issue was
briefly discussed in the target article where we argued that
alignment at the level of the situation model would override
alignment at lower levels (target article, endnote 4). Adopt-
ing a particular situation model will influence the way a
speaker frames almost everything he says, whereas adopt-
ing a particular word or syntactic structure will only affect
the subsequent choice of that word in preference to an-
other or influence the subsequent use of that particular syn-
tactic structure. Because the situation model is so perva-
sive, it will be constantly reinforced in implicit common
ground, and misalignment at this level will be more likely
to trigger interactive repair. This suggests that the time-
course of priming at the level of the situation model may be
long-lasting, whereas priming at low levels, such as phonol-
ogy, may be much more short-lived. Priming at the syntac-
tic level might be intermediate in duration, or depend more
on its precise context (as suggested above). It therefore
might be the case that priming of the situation model de-
pends primarily on memory representations, whereas prim-
ing at low levels might depend primarily on transient acti-
vation. All of this, however, requires detailed modeling.
We also believe that routinization plays an important role
in reinforcing the links between lower and higher levels of
representation. We take this up in section R9.
R4. What it means for interactive alignment to be
an automatic process
The commentators raise two important issues about auto-
maticity that require discussion. Krauss & Pardo argue
against the idea that alignment can be accounted for in
terms of automatic priming between interlocutors. Shintel
& Nusbaum argue that speech comprehension processes
may be far from automatic in dialogue. To answer these
concerns we need to first explicate our notion of auto-
maticity, and, second, indicate what we assume to be auto-
matic.
Our notion of automaticity is derived from the perspec-
tive of perception-action relationships (e.g., Hommel et al.
2001) and, more particularly, social cognition and social
cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Bargh 2001;
Hurley & Chater, in press). Just as Dijksterhuis and Bargh
argue for an automatic perception-behavior expressway, we
propose that the alignment channels are automatic (see
sect. 3.2) – they operate without any intermediary decision
process. Hence, the alignment process is automatic. To be
more explicit, we propose that the automaticity of align-
ment may take place at what Bargh (1989) calls the post-
conscious level, whereby automaticity requires awareness
of the stimulus when it originally occurred. This means that
interlocutors have to attend to what the other is saying in
order for automatic alignment to occur. Dijksterhuis and
Bargh (2001, p. 29) also argue that automatic social influ-
ences can be inhibited when they conflict with current goals
and purposes. We suggest that the same is true for interac-
tive alignment (see Garrod & Pickering 2004). For exam-
ple, if a maze game player wants to try a new description
scheme because he has failed to understand the last de-
scription from his interlocutor (see sect. 2.1 of the target ar-
ticle), then this high level goal of introducing a new scheme
may inhibit low level alignment arising from what his inter-
locutor has just said. However, in a similar vein to Dijkster-
huis and Bargh, we predict that overriding alignment is 
going to be more difficult (or effortful) than adopting align-
ment. Additionally, this postconscious notion of automatic-
ity can explain why alignment is affected by partner-specific
factors (e.g., Branigan et al., submitted; Metzing & Bren-
nan 2003), without invoking additional mechanisms such as
“other modeling.” It is also presumably relevant to many of
the factors that affect the extent of speech accommodation
(Giles et al. 1992). In general, we expect that rate of align-
ment may be affected by social factors even when the inter-
locutors are unaware that they are aligning. There is evidence
for such alignment outside language (Epley & Gilovich
1999; Lakin & Chartrand 2003), and we expect it also to
occur in language.
Krauss & Pardo agree with our claim that communica-
tion entails the alignment of situation models, but suggest
that it does not principally take place via automatic prim-
ing. For example, they point to evidence that speakers ac-
commodate to their listeners. This presents no problem ac-
cording to the above conception of automaticity, which
allows inhibition or facilitation by social factors. Glucks-
berg raises an interesting case, involving a difficult dia-
logue with a non-cooperative teenage son, in which degree
of alignment may be reduced.
Shintel & Nusbaum argue that speech comprehension
processes may be far from automatic in dialogue. We are
quite happy to accept this general point but see no prob-
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lems for our proposal. In our account, the process of align-
ing the structures used in comprehension (and production)
is automatic, but other aspects of comprehension (and pro-
duction) are presumably not automatic. Additionally, their
conception of automaticity is that it “implies a passive
process in which the input is processed in an invariant, in-
flexible manner, regardless of the beliefs and expectations
of the listener.” This is not the notion of automaticity that
we intend, and we hope that the above discussion of Bargh
(1989) helps to make this clear.
Our conception of automaticity also differs from a Skin-
nerian one, as suggested by Pear. Crucially, we assume that
alignment is not due to reinforcement, just as Dijksterhuis
and Bargh (2001) assume for the perception-behavior ex-
pressway. Instead, alignment follows from a primitive ten-
dency to imitate that does not appear to be learned (e.g.,
Metzoff & Decety 2003). However, our account does share
certain features with Skinner’s (1957) account, in particular
that alignment implicates low-level learning mechanisms.
R5. Parity
One concern is whether there is true representational par-
ity between production and comprehension. Ferreira de-
scribes experiments in which participants plan to produce
utterances that they know to be ungrammatical (i.e., par-
ticipants do not simply make errors). She assumes that in-
terlocutors use and understand such utterances during di-
alogue (which is almost certainly correct) and suggests that
comprehenders in dialogue would regard them as illicit.
Whereas it is possible that there are differences between
monologue and dialogue with respect to judgments of
grammaticality, we accept that such differences are un-
likely. In her experiments, we suggest that speakers realize
they are producing something ungrammatical, but do so
anyway because they cannot think of any other way of say-
ing what they want to say. As long as this realization takes
place within the production system (i.e., does not purely oc-
cur during self-monitoring), there does not appear to be a
problem for the parity assumption. Compare sports com-
mentators who sometimes cannot identify a player at the
point when they need to produce the utterance (“About to
kick the ball, Smith”), which listeners might well regard as
illicit. This account seems more likely than a real disconnect
between grammars in comprehension and production.
However, if there is a disconnect for some highly specific
constructions, it merely leads to a very slight weakening of
the parity assumption, not its abandonment.
Ginzburg argues that the interpretation of the same se-
quence of words can change according to whether it repre-
sents a single contribution from one speaker or two contri-
butions from different speakers:
1. A: Which members of our team own a parakeet? A:
Why? ( Why own a parakeet?)
2. A: Which members of our team own a parakeet? B:
Why? ( Why are you asking which members of our team
own a parakeet?)
He suggests that our interactive alignment mechanism can-
not account for the fact that Why? has a different interpre-
tation in interactions (1) and (2). This is an interesting ob-
servation, but the difference in interpretation between (1)
and (2) hinges on the dialogue move (e.g., questioning, an-
swering, checking, informing) being performed at that
point. Because dialogue moves are generally associated
with particular speakers, it is obviously crucial that inter-
locutors monitor the source of an utterance when inter-
preting it (as also follows from results like those of Metzing
& Brennan 2003). For example, the speaker treats a ques-
tion from his interlocutor differently from the way he would
treat a question from himself. We accept that interlocutors
can monitor the source of a contribution (i.e., they can dif-
ferentiate between what they are saying and what their
partner is saying) and can take this into account in their in-
terpretation at the level of the dialogue move.
Cutting proposes parity for semantic but not phonolog-
ical representations on the basis of picture-word interfer-
ence experiments. From his brief description, we suggest
that participants process the words that they actually pro-
duce both semantically and phonologically, but that they
process the words that they are told to ignore semantically
but not phonologically (or at least not to a sufficient depth
to affect priming). Krauss & Pardo also question evidence
for phonological alignment (and by implication for phono-
logical parity). Although we accept that Goldinger (1998)
does not directly demonstrate phonological alignment, re-
cent evidence does support parity between production and
comprehension at this level (Fowler et al. 2003).
Kempson defends a more radical proposal that parity
comes from the symmetry between production and parsing
processes. In her Dynamic Syntax account of parsing, syn-
tactic information is combined with lexical information,
which define semantic interpretations that are built up
word-by-word. Production is assumed to work in essentially
the same way. Hence, she sees interactive alignment as op-
erating at the level of the production and parsing processes
themselves. This is a challenging linguistic proposal, but it
would need explicit modeling before it could be incorpo-
rated into a mechanistic account of language processing in
dialogue.
R6. Is it only misunderstanding that drives
interactive repair?
One concern is whether interactive repair is driven primar-
ily by comprehension failure, as we proposed in section 4.3
of the target article. Healey points out that even in the con-
text of Garrod and Anderson’s (1987) maze-game dialogues,
interlocutors change their description scheme in a system-
atic fashion (e.g., shifting from a path or figural scheme to
a line or matrix scheme). He argues that it is unlikely that
this systematic shift can be accounted for only in terms of
an interactive repair mechanism based on comprehension
failure. Of course we recognize (see sect. 4.4 of the target
article) that alignment does not depend only upon this
process. There are many things that determine what peo-
ple choose to say and even how they do so which go beyond
the simple automatic mechanisms discussed in the target
article. For example, the shift in description scheme that
Healey mentions probably reflects two opposing pressures.
Whereas the abstract line and matrix descriptions are more
efficient over a period of time than figural or path descrip-
tions (e.g., a line or matrix description involves few words
and is not influenced by whether the position is near a
salient point in the maze or lies in a salient pattern), they
are more difficult to align (e.g., matrix descriptions depend
upon alignment of the origin and of the counting conven-
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tions used). So they can often not be used securely until
there is a richer implicit common ground (e.g., repeated
use of path descriptions which begin at one corner of the
maze can lead to this corner being adopted as the origin for
matrix description). We suspect that once the implicit
common ground has become sufficiently rich to support the
more abstract description, a speaker is more likely to adopt
that scheme when he encounters a position that is particu-
larly awkward to describe even when it requires a violation
of alignment.
Note that this shift occurs without the speaker having to
take account of the listener’s knowledge. Healey therefore
brings up an important general point, that interlocutors can
go beyond interactive alignment and repair in ways that do
not require other-modeling or the establishment of a full
common ground. For example, a speaker can decide that a
representational scheme is unnecessarily complex or a re-
ferring expression is unnecessarily long even if the inter-
locutors have aligned on that scheme or expression. Simi-
larly, in preparing lectures, I might change how I am
speaking on the basis of my knowledge of the audience (full
common ground), but I might also do it on the basis that
“Hang on, I’m not doing this efficiently, given my own re-
sources – I am trying to remember too much and can’t man-
age it.” This might be argued to involve access to a second
model of one’s own mental state, which is therefore costly,
but less costly than keeping track of full common ground.
Such decisions require there to be some inhibition of the
basic alignment process in light of a conflicting goal (see
sect. R4). In conclusion, Healey’s point reflects something
that is additional to our account rather than in conflict with
it (cf. Krauss & Pardo, who point out that not only mis-
understanding drives accommodation).
R7. Other modeling
Although interlocutors undeniably do pay attention to each
others’ mental states on occasion, our contention is that
such other-modeling is resource-intensive, essentially be-
cause it involves storing two representations: a repre-
sentation of one’s own state of knowledge, and a separate
representation of one’s partner’s state of knowledge. We
therefore believe that most of the process of alignment oc-
curs via the interactive-alignment mechanism where other-
modeling is not required. But we stress that other-model-
ing is not purely used for “difficult” cases of interactive
repair when automatic processes fail to work. When a boy
decides to tell his mother what happened at school today,
he presumably realizes that his mother does not know about
the event in question, and therefore that he knows some-
thing that his mother does not know. This explicit modeling
of the difference between knowledge states leads to him
running to tell his mother about the event, and does not fol-
low from the failure of interactive alignment and interac-
tive repair. Similarly, a bilingual decides which language to
speak on the basis of his assumptions about which language
his listener knows. However, the undeniable use of such
“broad-brush” other-modeling does not mean that other-
modeling is employed in a fine-grained way to explain de-
tailed decisions about one’s individual contributions to an
ongoing dialogue.
In this context, Krauss & Pardo point to evidence that
speakers sometimes modulate their utterances to take into
account their knowledge of the listener: They produce
more informative contributions when they perceive their
addressees to be less knowledgeable about the relevant
topic (see also Isaacs & Clark 1987). The evidence from
Kingsbury (1968) shows that speakers do not simply pay at-
tention to what they believe about their specific interlocu-
tor but make inferences about how much such a person is
likely to know on the basis of the evidence at hand, which
is, in this case, made quite deliberately apparent to the
speaker (e.g., the questioner frames a question to stress his
ignorance of the city). In general, we suspect that speakers
make a one-off decision based on such issues as the per-
ceived expertise of their addressees about how to frame
their contributions (e.g., the decision not to make any as-
sumptions about local geographic knowledge). A teacher
can be much less explicit in the common room than in the
classroom, and a mother does not speak motherese to her
friends. Such decisions need not remain fixed for the whole
conversation (e.g., they might change when the speaker
guesses that his addressee is not a local but then realizes he
is mistaken). But such a change is very different from a con-
tinuous, dynamic process of utterance accommodation
based on full common-ground inference, which we argue
to be implausible for reasons of resource limitations (see
sect. 4.1 of the target article). We are therefore grateful to
Krauss & Pardo for stressing that explicit modeling does not
only occur when automatic processes fail to produce align-
ment, but we see no concern for our assumption that auto-
matic mechanisms underlie alignment.
Fussell & Kraut argue that speakers with different
views of a spatial scene take into account the listener’s per-
spective, in effect modeling the listener’s mental state. They
describe a collaborative bicycle repair situation in which an
expert helper guides a novice repairer. They note that when
the repairer knows that he can be seen even when he can-
not see his remote helper, he will use deictic expressions to
describe the things in front of him (e.g., See this piece, while
pointing at a cycle component), whereas the remote helper
will not (e.g., See the derailleur). They argue that this is in-
consistent with alignment and provides further evidence of
other modeling. We are not convinced. We suspect that
speakers in this situation prefer to use deictic expressions
because they are shorter, do not require word finding, and
so on. But deixis is not an option for the remote helper be-
cause he cannot point to anything. Instead, he has to fall
back on more complex nondeictic descriptions. (One re-
mote helper is quoted as saying in frustration, “If I could
point to it, it’s right there”; Kraut et al. 2003, p. 36.) So the
circumstances may force the speaker to use a more complex
nonaligned utterance. It is of course reasonable that align-
ment is broken under such circumstances, because it sim-
ply would not work. One important point this raises is that
the tendency toward alignment is likely to be stronger un-
der conditions where two interlocutors are placed in com-
parable environments. Presumably this reflects nonlinguis-
tic contributions to linguistic alignment (see also the
discussion of Dominey in sect. R11).
Nevertheless, we certainly agree with the general point
that when communicators share a physical situation they
take situational awareness into account in formulating ut-
terances. But is this evidence for listener modeling? In the
“side-by-side” situation described by Kraut et al. (2003,
communicators use direction of gaze to establish joint at-
tention, but the effect of one partner’s point of gaze on the
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other partner’s focus of attention reflects low-level mecha-
nisms which do not depend on inferences about the part-
ner’s mental state (see Schuller & Rossion 2001). And, be-
cause in this situation what is accessible to the speaker will
usually be equally accessible to the partner (see sect. 4.1),
an essentially egocentric approach will generally support
successful communication without requiring speakers to
model their listeners.
Schober suggests that current evidence cannot distin-
guish two possibilities: that interlocutors only model each
other’s mental states under exceptional circumstances, and
that interlocutors normally model each other’s mental
states and only fail to do so when under great cognitive load
or when circumstances weigh heavily against doing so. We
accept that current evidence does not distinguish between
these two positions. However, our account assumes the use
of fewer resources and is parsimonious (obviously, an ac-
count containing two mental models is harder to falsify than
an account limited to one, just as a parallel account is harder
to falsify than a serial account). Moreover, Schober’s pro-
posal cannot hold for multiparty dialogues containing more
than a small number of people, because it must become im-
possible to retain and regularly update a different mental
model for each person. In general, cognitive psychology
teaches us that constructing mental models is hard and
holding onto different models at the same time is especially
hard (e.g., Johnson-Laird 1983). We suggest that the para-
dox of how one can know when to model one’s partner is
easy to accommodate: Contributions to the dialogue will
make it clear that alignment is breaking down, and if inter-
active repair does not solve the problem, the interlocutor is
forced to assume that what his partner knows is likely to be
different from what he knows. Even in such cases, it may
be that interlocutors only model those differences between
themselves and their partners that need to be modeled in
order to allow the recovery of alignment.
Brennan & Metzing also criticize our assumption that
interlocutors do not routinely employ full common ground.
A fast-growing body of literature suggests that interlocutors
sometimes do pay attention to each others’ knowledge in
comprehension and production (e.g., Hanna et al. 2003;
Lockridge & Brennan 2002; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002) and
sometimes do not (e.g., Brown & Dell 1987; Ferreira &
Dell 2000; Keysar et al. 2003). It is too early to say precisely
when such knowledge can affect processes of production
and comprehension, but current evidence suggests both
that interlocutors can immediately draw upon knowledge
about differences between their own knowledge and their
beliefs about their partner’s knowledge, and that interlocu-
tors can make egocentric decisions about production and
comprehension. Most of these studies involve a fairly arti-
ficial situation in which the experimental subject is in-
formed that his interlocutor may have knowledge about the
situation that differs from his in quite specific ways. Exper-
iments like that of Hanna et al. (2003) show that it can be
straightforward to add one fact about your interlocutor –
namely, that he does not have access to a particular piece of
information that you have. Even in such cases, some ego-
centric behavior remains, as Hanna et al. acknowledge and
Keysar et al. (2003) demonstrate. But adding one fact about
your interlocutor’s knowledge is quite different from main-
taining a full representation of the interlocutor’s situation
model, and performing reasoning based on that model.
Available resources do not normally allow interlocutors to
constantly update models of each others’ mental states.
However, this does not lead to communicative breakdown
because aligned interlocutors develop the same situation
models.
In response to Brennan & Metzing, we stress that it
was not our intention to commit to a two-stage account
(e.g., Horton & Keysar 1996), in which other modeling oc-
curs during revision but not during initial processing
(whether production or comprehension). We note that
Krauss & Pardo and Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus also
interpret us as making this proposal, and accept that we did
not make this very clear. Rather, we claim that “performing
inferences about common ground is an optional strategy
that interlocutors employ only when resources allow” (tar-
get article, sect. 4.2, para. 4).
We do not regard Metzing and Brennan’s (2003) demon-
stration of partner-specific effects as problematic, and as-
sume they can be explained in similar ways to Branigan et
al.’s (2003) demonstration that syntactic alignment is sensi-
tive to participant status (see sect. 2.3 of the target article).
As we have pointed out in section R4 of this response, we
assume that alignment is automatic at a postconscious level
(Bargh 1989) and, hence, can be affected by a range of so-
cial factors from stereotype activation to participant status.
A particular speaker is associated with a particular form,
and breaking that association causes disruption. There is no
need for other modeling to occur in this process of partner-
specific lexical entrainment. The term conceptual pact ap-
pears to suggest that other modeling is used in lexical en-
trainment. If so, we would question whether it is generally
appropriate.
R8. Routines
Schiller & de Ruiter propose that interactive alignment
necessarily involves selecting stored fragments from previ-
ous utterances. This corresponds to our notion of rou-
tinization (see sect. 5 of the target article). We suspect that
routinization comes about as a result of a longer lasting
alignment mechanism based on memory retrieval rather
than transient activation. This is because routines reflect
multiple links between different levels of representation
(e.g., they fix the relation between a word and its meaning,
its syntactic form, and even its interpretation within a situ-
ation model) and it is difficult to imagine how this could be
captured and routinized through purely transient activa-
tion. Rather than assume that routinization is the sole ex-
planation of alignment, we suggest that it is a consequence
of implicit learning but that transient activation also pro-
motes alignment (see sect. R3). It may of course be that
routines emerge from a resonance process, as Goldinger
& Azuma suggest. In addition, because routinization works
by linking levels of representation, it may explain how align-
ment percolates up from lower to higher levels (cf. issues
raised by Warren & Rayner and Branigan, as discussed
in sect. R3).
Within the interactive-alignment account, we regard
routines as an extreme case of alignment, involving a fixed
form and interpretation. It may be best to think of rou-
tinization as falling on a continuum, with expressions that
contain some fixed elements (as in many of Kuiper’s 1996
examples) being more or less “semi-routinized.” Assuming
that it is correct to regard alignment as a mixture of tran-
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sient activation and implicit learning, we propose that the
more routinized an expression is, the more it is best ex-
plained in terms of implicit learning – for the purposes of
the conversation at least, the expression and its interpreta-
tion are stored and retrieved. Of course, if an expression be-
comes sufficiently entrenched, it may survive that conver-
sation. Although other frameworks are no doubt possible,
we regard Jackendoff ’s (2002) account of fixed and semi-
fixed expressions as an appropriate representational scheme
for semi- and completely routinized expressions (see Pick-
ering & Garrod, in press, for discussion).
R9. Self-monitoring
Schiller & de Ruiter question our claim that self-moni-
toring can occur at any level of linguistic representation that
can be aligned. We did not claim that there is conclusive ev-
idence for this hypothesis and we believe that careful em-
pirical work is needed to distinguish our proposal from the
proposal that monitoring works externally on sound and in-
ternally on phonological representations alone. However,
we would query whether the reported evidence provides
strong support for this alternative proposal. First, the com-
parative slowness of selecting a gender label in comparison
to selecting the indefinite article in French may have many
explanations, perhaps most likely that selecting between
genders is a more abstract and difficult task than selecting
between (very common) words. Second, the strong evi-
dence for monitoring of various aspects of phonological
representations is completely compatible with monitoring
of other linguistic representations. Although some or all
gender-congruency effects in picture-word interference
tasks may really be determiner congruency effects (Schiller
& Caramazza 2003), there is also considerable evidence
that grammatical gender can be accessed when phonologi-
cal form is not available (Badecker et al. 1995; Vigliocco et
al. 1997). Therefore, it is at least plausible that people can
directly monitor for errors of grammatical gender and in-
deed for other aspects of syntactic representations. If an ut-
terance is ill-formed at different levels of representation si-
multaneously, we suspect that there may be a race between
monitoring processes at these different levels, in which case
it might not always be possible to detect monitoring that
takes place at the “slower” level.
R10. On the difference between dialogue and
monologue
A number of commentators argue that language processing
in dialogue is not fundamentally different from that in
monologue. For example, both Barr & Keysar and
Glucksberg point out that the same basic language pro-
cesses operate in monologue and dialogue so there is no
principled difference between the two. We agree in the
sense that the actual production and comprehension mech-
anisms are the same (at what we might term a “microlevel”).
However, the radically different contexts in which they op-
erate lead to very different results. For example, a speaker’s
utterances are dramatically affected by the presence of the
interlocutor – the speaker aligns with the interlocutor’s ut-
terances via the mechanisms we have described. In this re-
spect we argue that the language processing system is de-
signed for dialogue rather than monologue. As a result,
speakers have to learn special strategies to deal with mono-
logue which are not required during dialogue processing.
We agree with Glucksberg that dialogue is not neces-
sarily easier than monologue, and accept that contextual ef-
fects can be very strong in monologue. We propose that the
priming mechanisms are ideally suited for dialogue. Pre-
sumably they have developed from imitation (Arbib, in
press) and it may be that the organization of dialogue (e.g.,
time between turns) is optimal for the mechanisms of prim-
ing. Therefore, dialogue does not need to rely on nonauto-
matic inference. In contrast, monologue cannot use prim-
ing between interlocutors (by definition) and therefore has
to rely on inference, other-modeling, and so on. Priming is
of course present in monologue, but we contend that it is
far less useful than in dialogue (e.g., repetition is much rarer
in monologue than in dialogue; see sect. 5.1 of the target ar-
ticle). So we concur that there is not a principled distinc-
tion between dialogue and monologue, but at the same time
maintain that dialogue will usually but not always be easier
than monologue.
Barr & Keysar appear to disagree with us more than we
think they actually do. They are mistaken in assuming that
we propose a categorical distinction between monologue
and dialogue. In section 8 of the target article, we refer to
a “dialogic continuum” with monologue at one end, and
fully interactive dialogue at the other. We assume that the
same mechanisms are present in dialogue and monologue
(i.e., people do not set some processing “switch”). In true
monologue, the speaker has no interlocutor to align with.
He can of course align with himself and certainly does so
(e.g., re-using the same word with the same meaning). We
completely agree that dialogues go through various stages,
with some involving rapid turn-taking (e.g., question an-
swering) and some involving much more limited feedback
(e.g., during narratives). Boden (1994) distinguishes be-
tween conversational phases and presentational phases in
group discussion. These presentational phases are not
monologues, as even minimal feedback affects them con-
siderably (Bavelas et al. 2000).
Hence, we stress that monologue and dialogue lie on a
continuum, and we predict that the degree of alignment
will be affected by the position on the continuum. One im-
portant area for research is to consider the effects of dia-
logue genre on alignment (in which context we can regard
monologue as particular genre). For example, Schegloff
points to the importance of different speech-exchange sys-
tems (conversation, interview, giving a speech, etc.) in af-
fecting the characteristics of the dialogue (e.g., turn-taking
behavior, routinization). We predict that the rate and char-
acteristics of alignment are not constant for all forms of di-
alogue, but will depend on the speech-exchange system.
For example, forms of interaction that do not allow uncon-
strained feedback and where turn-taking is externally man-
aged (e.g., interviews) will fail to employ the interactive re-
pair mechanism to the extent that is possible in casual
conversation.
R11. Extensions and discussion
Schegloff argues that our mechanistic account fails to con-
sider the richness of the interaction afforded by dialogue.
Although Schegloff ’s sociological starting point (i.e., in
terms of organizational practice and interaction contingen-
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cies) is somewhat different from ours, we certainly agree
that there are additional specific details of dialogue organi-
zation that must enter into any complete mechanistic ac-
count. We also recognize the considerable contribution that
Schegloff and colleagues have made in mapping out the de-
tails of these organizational practices and the contingencies
they afford. However, our mechanistic aspiration goes be-
yond mapping out such practices and contingencies. Like
Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus we believe that a mecha-
nistic account should make it possible to formulate a com-
putational model of the processes involved in the compre-
hension and production of dialogue and how these take
advantage of the interactional nature of dialogue. We also
recognize that any complete model will have to take ac-
count of both self and other commitments in dialogue pro-
cessing (see our response to Ginzburg in sect. R5). We
stress that our paper is entitled “Toward a mechanistic psy-
chology of dialogue”!
Two commentators argue for a broadening of the inter-
active alignment account to include other interactive situa-
tions. Mazur proposes that interactive alignment needs to
be embedded in a broader theory of communication that
pays attention to a range of social conventions. We agree
that a full theory of interactive alignment will make refer-
ence to nonlinguistic as well as linguistic information, and
believe that our suggestions about the relations between
our account and implicit social cognition is a step in this di-
rection.
Dominey draws interesting parallels between the inter-
active alignment process in adult dialogue and certain fea-
tures of language acquisition. Language learning depends
upon extralinguistic or prelinguistic alignment mechanisms
(e.g., establishing joint attention on intended referents
through gaze direction or postural orientation). Also, there
is evidence that routinization of utterances associated with
repeated action scenarios (feeding, bathing, etc.) may play
an important role in the acquisition of syntax (Tomasello
2003). These suggestions help reinforce the claim that non-
linguistic alignment may lead to linguistic alignment, just as
linguistic alignment at one level leads to linguistic align-
ment at other levels (see our discussion of Fussell & Kraut
in sect. R7). In fact, Dominey suggests that such linguistic/
nonlinguistic links are necessary to explain the process of
language acquisition, where one partner (the infant) does
not initially have linguistic abilities. A full theory of how in-
teractive alignment might explain acquisition would be fas-
cinating. In particular, we are intrigued by the suggestion
that learning by alignment might avoid the enlistment of
generative grammar mechanisms, perhaps in a way similar
to that envisaged by Tomasello.
Language acquisition is a good example of how it may be
possible to extend our account into new domains. Other ar-
eas that we have highlighted at various points in the target
article and this response include social psychology and hu-
man-computer interaction. A recurring theme is that it may
be sensible to include nonlinguistic alignment into devel-
opments of our model; interlocutors who are aligned in
nonlinguistic (e.g., body posture) or paralinguistic (e.g.,
tone of voice) ways may be more likely to align linguistically.
We emphasize that our use of the term “priming” is at a
fairly abstract functional level, as our notion of automatic-
ity makes clear (sect. R4). It allows nonconscious media-
tion by factors that may originate in distinctions that inter-
locutors are aware of (e.g., participant status, social status,
cooperativeness). We also note that “priming” may employ
transient activation or implicit learning or both. To be more
speculative, we suspect that interactive alignment may
work by two distinct mechanisms: a brief activation-based
process that may not be affected by intentional distinctions,
and a longer-lasting memory-based process that is inten-
tionally mediated. The effects of these two processes will
depend on precise timing, and will therefore be differ-
entially affected by aspects of the conversation that affect
timing. For example, a high-engagement face-to-face dia-
logue between intimate friends may result in timing that is
precisely attuned to increasing alignment, whereas a dia-
logue between strangers that depend on external factors
such as rules of engagement (e.g., in an interview) or tech-
nology (e.g., walkie-talkies) may not. We suspect that the
longer-lasting process will not be affected but the activation
process might be impaired in low-involvement dialogue.
These speculative comments could inform an extensive
program of empirical research concerned with the condi-
tions that lead to alignment in dialogue (e.g., its time
course).
The other obvious area for development is explicit com-
putational modeling, as highlighted by Brown-Schmidt &
Tanenhaus in particular. To perform such modeling, it
would of course be necessary to explicate many assump-
tions of our account that are currently vague or implicit, for
instance by developing interactive alignment, interactive
repair, and other-modeling components. It would be nec-
essary to model the process whereby alignment at one level
leads to alignment at other levels, and to understand how
conflicts of alignment are resolved (see Warren &
Rayner). We need to know whether transient activation
and implicit learning should be distinguished, and if so, how
they interact. Finally, any such account should explain the
process of routinization and describe its effects on align-
ment.
NOTE
1. Note that the uses of “interactive” in interactive alignment
and interactive activation are unrelated.
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